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FIDELITY THROUGH HISTORY: COLLOQUY
PROFESSOR RAKOVE: Certainly one of the great ambitions
that I had in writing my book was, obviously, to add a historian's perspective to a legal debate. I am very interested to see what kind of
absorption my ideas are going to have in the legal community, and to
judge from this panel it is going to be a long and somewhat indeterminate process to find out what the results will, in fact, be.
There are a couple of points that came up that I will just very
quickly note before I add one other point. One involves, what I guess
we are calling the disaggregation of ratifier understanding problem,
that I think Larry Kramer in particular, addressed. It is a leading argument in my book, so that's one I would certainly call attention to.
Also, in Larry's comments on historians: I think historians are the
lonely long-distance runners of the human sciences, and one reason
for that is that we are always nervous to publish until we are sure we
have exhausted our sources. Larry talks about the primal sources and
claims that we ought to be interested in the squib's parodies and jingle-jangle verses, and conversely that we should not be interested in
private correspondence. I actually happen to disagree with those
claims on the merits. It seems to me a lot of the jingle-jangle verses
are so much noise that we are entitled to discount, because-whether
you are Straussian or not-they don't add much of lasting value to the
debate. We want to look for the best statements of the rival positions
and work from those, and this is what I tried to do in organizing my
material in the book.
I think private letters are very important. They are especially important to me as a Madisonian, and as a Madison biographer. A lot of
the writing I have done for the last dozen years, especially my piece
Mr. Meese Meet Mr. Madison from some years ago, relies on the interesting tension between Madison's continued defense of the national
veto on state laws in his October 24, 1787 letter to Jefferson, and Federalist 10, which was published four weeks later. So those are important points of methodology, and if this were a more focused forum on
the propositions I put forward I would pursue them at greater length.
I want to put those aside now, and discuss a different point. There
is an aspect of fidelity to history that I alluded to when I quoted
Gordon Wood, and which I said earlier I would like to discuss in the
context some of Bruce's remarks yesterday and a few passing references we have heard previously. Some of you may know that the Atlantic has hit the newsstands with an excerpt from Conor Cruise
O'Brien's book that is supposed to be a rather slashing piece about
Jefferson, which is a big problem in American historiography and indeed in the political culture of originalism in the broader sense of the
term. This is something that I like to think all historians in the founding period have agonized over a great deal, for the last twenty-five
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years and more, because it exposes not only the original sin of the
American Republic, but the largest single ongoing problem we face in
our legal and political culture. More generally, it poses especially difficult problems for a teacher. I know law professors are supposed to
shock their students into a state of complete moral anarchy, and then
to reconstruct their fragile intellects thereafter. But when I discuss
Jefferson, I deal with eighteen- and nineteen-year olds, and I think
that makes it an even more troubling situation.
Now, the problem I am alluding to here-I should restate it more
generally is: Does a historian have a moral responsibility to his subjects as well as his readers, and to his own sense of professional craft?
I think the answer should be yes. But what moral responsibility do I
have to Jefferson and Madison (especially the latter, but these guys
were so close, it is hard to disaggregate them). What is my moral
responsibility as, in a sense, the perpetuator of their acts and deeds
and thoughts and memories? There are very different positions that
one can take on this. If Paul Finkelman-who writes in much the
same vein I do, but probably falls out a little bit differently on a political spectrum-were here, he would offer a tougher critique. I think it
would be fair to say that Paul and others would say that our goal as
historians, in some way, is to liberate ourselves from the past, in much
the same terms as Bruce used yesterday. They would say: We have to
be honest about this; we have to not just note the contradiction, but
place it in the forefront of our consciousness. But I have actually
taken a rather different tack in my teaching. In my American History
survey course I actually try to make a strong case for Jefferson, and,
indeed in my book, I make a strong case for what I see as the beneficial aspects of the Three-Fifths Clause, of which I am actually something of a fan.
I would rephrase the problem in this way-and this is what I tell my
students and I will tell you: Moral judgments are easy; anybody can
make a moral judgment about the past. We have exquisite moral sensibilities of our own. It is not hard to call a crime a crime, ex post
facto, at least in the moral sense, if not in the legal sense. So, it is easy
to come in and say these guys were obviously hypocrites and failed to
live up to their own norms and expectations for themselves, and therefore whatever our notion of fidelity to the past must mean, it allows us
moral room to pass a harsh and severe decree upon them.
I take a rather different tack. If moral judgments are easy, there
isn't all that much point making them. I mean, there is not much serious work to be done there. The real heavy lifting-that's a phrase I
use and Chris [Eisgruber] used earlier-the real heavy lifting in historical work is to explain why people in the past acted in the way they
did. It is to explain how they lived a contradiction. It is to explain
how they could somehow reconcile, in not very satisfactory ways to us,
what seems to be a strong and principled and explosive belief in
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equality-and the forms of constitutionalism that grew out of that
commitment-with the fact that they were members of the society
which seemed to regard property in other people as part of the natural
order of things. That's the hard problem. Now, I don't want to reach
the position to say that to know all is to forgive all. We don't have to
go that far in thinking about these issues. But I think the hard work is
to understand what were the sources of the contradiction? Where did
the contradiction lead? What were the tensions it created and how
were they balanced out?
And there is a sense in which I think there is a much better case to
be made for Jefferson than the ones we rather ffippantly tend to throw
off in these contexts. So, let me just run two arguments by you real
quickly that I offer by way of dealing with this. The first is that I think
it is a fundamental aspect of the history of American constitutionalism
that Jefferson had the good sense to put in the Declaration of Independence the statement that all men are created equal. If you know
the genesis of this-and Pauline Maier has a book that is coming out
next year which I think will clarify the genesis of it-it is very much
tied to the debate in Virginia, in the first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights as to what form an equality statement should take.
But whatever Jefferson's ambition, the recognition of equality as a
fundamental principle, had at least this effect. Equality is, in my view,
inherently a corrosive concept; corrosive not in the sense of rusting
away, but in the sense that once you legitimate it in one sphere of
activity, it is impossible to restrain it there. It inherently carries over
into others. So, I think the republic probably owes Jefferson a great
deal for having the good sense to make that commitment, despite
himself.
Secondly and more important-this is a more historical argumentif we ask, what is it that makes emancipation possible? it has always
seemed to me that we can only explain emancipation in terms of the
religious history of the American people. And, in fact, in terms that
are fundamentally Protestant. I used the term, in context with Professor Levinson, but it is the same basic fact. (And, of course, here we
are at Fordham, and I am a Jewish kid from Chicago and I am saying
this is a fundamentally Protestant culture.)
What is it that allowed the North to sustain the enormous cost that
the emancipation of slavery entailed? It seems to me that it has to
involve something more than a sense that slavery is a fundamental
wrong because it contradicts the equality principle. It was a fundamental wrong, but there are a lot of things that are wrong in the world
that we tolerate, and, of course, we tolerate as much as people in the
Eighteenth Century did. But you say that slavery is sinful-which is,
of course, what people said in the thirty years leading up to the Civil
War-then you shift the equation m rather dramatic and powerful
ways.
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Now, what is it that made it possible for Americans, at least
Northerners, to say that slavery was sinful in the decades leading up to
the Civil War? This argument doesn't work too well for Southern
Baptists, of course. But what was it that made it possible at least in
the North to form something of an anti-slavery consensus that enables
the North to sustain some hundreds of thousands of casualties in the
end to rid the South, to rid the nation, of this blight? It was, I think,
the fact that mid-nineteenth century America was a more Protestant
society and a more vigorously Protestant society than eighteenth-century America.
And what is it that makes that possible? Well, there are many explanations for what Jon Butler has called the antebellum spiritual hot
house of Nineteenth Century culture. I think among the very most
important factors was the commitment to disestablishment and free
exercise of conscience that was so much a part of the JeffersonianMadisonian project. And it is so much a part of our constitutional
legacy, because it is that commitment which makes possible, in a direct and indirect way, the enormous creativity of Nineteenth Century
American Protestantism, and with it, the rebirth or the reinvigoration
of those Calvinist sensibilities which are essential to anti-slavery.
So, a historian with a moral responsibility to his subjects has to be
as ambiguous here as he might be elsewhere in other respects. On the
one hand, he has to be prepared with Finkelman to say, we have to be
honest about who these guys were, but he also has to try to explain
why they failed, what the sources of their failure were, and he has to
deal with the consequences, sometimes inadvertent, of their actions,
and which may over time have actually redeemed them from the original sins to which they were a party. So, that is a kind of final point
here, which I am going to try to work on at some points in the revisions and space permitting, put into my paper, it seems to me appropriate, because the notions of fidelity both of the historian and the
lawyer involve some evaluation of the moral quality of what was done
in the past, and I would want the ledger to be balanced and not to be
drawn up in a kind of casual and even flippant way.
PROFESSOR KACZOROWSKI: Are there questions?
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR LEVINSON: I have two nits to
pick and then a cheap shot. One nit is with Larry Kramer. It seems to
me that if you know that something is offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis, you will make strategic decisions on how you represent features
of a bill or Constitution in a way different from if it were a genuine
clause by clause choice. If you think there is a lot of opposition to a
clause but you want the whole thing to pass you will say, don't worry,
it really doesn't have these dreadful consequences. If you are opposed to the whole thing, you will say, don't you realize this just is the
very worst thing and so on and so forth. So, I think that your notion
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that Jack's point isn't a powerful one is mistaken. I think it remains a
powerful point that was offered, take it or leave it.
The nit with Bob is that I think that, in fact, Prigg v. Pennsylvania'
is a far more excessive case than McCullough v. Maryland,2 because
McCullough is at least a Necessary and Proper Clause case, an Article
I case. Prigg is not an Article I case. There is no conceivable reference to anything in Article I, Section 8, to justify the Fugitive Slave
Clause. You have to do it as an Article IV case, and there are notorious embarrassments with doing that. The Court basically just punts
on this, and says we are not going to explain exactly why it is constitutional but it just has to be the case.
The cheap shot really is directed at Steve Calabresi. I have always
been intrigued with the fact that the Federalist Society, and I am using
Steve as the representative of the Federalist Society, has James
Madison's iconic figure, because it seems to me that among the things
that are important about Madison is that he really didn't believe very
much in theories of original intent. His one great effort, arguably, to
make an original intent pitch was that the bank was unconstitutional,
and the most important feature of the case book that Paul Brest and I
edited is that it begins with Madison's speech. He lost, however. So
this at least raises the point that for all of Madison's importance, he
just wasn't taken that seriously as a guide to what the Constitution
meant, and maybe originalism wasn't even taken all that seriously as a
guide to what the Constitution meant. But the cheap shot, the serious
question, is: Why don't you have Alexander Hamilton as your iconographic figure instead of James Madison? Hamilton was the winner
after all. But I suspect you think that Hamilton, when all was said and
done, isn't quite so classy a guy as James Madison in terms of selling
the Federalist program.
PROFESSOR KRAMER: Sandy, I just want to answer about the
disaggregation point. The fact is it wasn't offered on a take it or leave
it basis. Whether it would be taken on a take it or leave it basis was
part of the debate. One of the things I go through in the paper here is
exactly the debate over that. So, the whole issue of conditional
amendments and whether to allow them, and the way people were
persuaded out of them, and the timing of that is irrelevant. So, your
point is right to some extent, but it is not as though anyone up front
knew they were committed to that, and therefore, had to change their
arguments in light of it necessarily. That was up for grabs.
PROFESSOR KACZOROWSKI: Excuse me, I think you [Professor Calabresi] really do deserve an opportunity to respond.
PROFESSOR CALABRESI: I was going to say, I think there are
many reasons why Madison was picked as the emblem, not least of
1. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
2. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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which the defense of checks and balances of a structural Constitution,
which we thought was being overlooked, and the importance of the
essays and The FederalistPapers. Obviously there is no founding figure that one could agree with completely.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR LEVINSON: I would like to
ask Akhil, if the object of constitutional meaning for him is the entire
Constitution as opposed to the clause or the theory or the generation,
don't we also need a further, a more comprehensive theory of interpretation to tell us how to address the text? What is the text (which
would be a relatively simple question)? What is the structure (which
would presumably be a more difficult question)? What are the priorities, if it turned out that a textual injunction was in conflict with the
structure of the Constitution?
This also applies to Jed Rubenfeld's paradigms. Paradigms don't
remove the need for a theory of interpretation, because you need a
theory of interpretation to identify paradigms. Which are the paradigms and what do they mean? And so isn't this attempt, which seems
to me to circumvent-and I might have misunderstood you therethe need to have a theory of interpretation? Isn't all of this dependent on first having a theory of interpretation?
PROFESSOR AMAR: When I am thinking about passing a car on
the freeway, knowing calculus would be extremely helpful in trying to
figure out whether I can do this without getting steamrolled by the
truck coming in the other lane-but lots of folks today manage to
drive pretty well without knowing calculus.
I don't know how elaborate a general theory of interpretation of all
documents it is necessary to self-consciously have in order to do interpretation, which we all do all the time. So, to that extent I want to
associate myself with Jed, who I think was not contradicted, really, by
many of his fellow panelists, in suggesting that one wants an account
of the Constitution which may or may not be an account of all
interpretation.
So, I do think it is important to think about what kind of document
the Constitution is. It is more than just a document, but what is the
object of the interpretation and what purposes does a written Constitution have? So, I think all of that, but I don't know about a general
theory of interpretation, and the Wittgenstenians might say actually
that sometimes rather than a general theory with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are particularly good exemplars or prototypes
of good interpretation.
I intended in my exposition to try to give you some examples of
consitutional interpretation-by their fruits you will know them-because it is so difficult to do in the abstract. I actually think it is more
helpful sometimes to say, here is how I would do it here, now tell me
whether you agree or not, and then we can actually in the context of
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that conversation try to think about what might be a better interpretive approach.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: You can't be serious here, Akhil,
about the car driving analogy though, right? You are not under these
circumstances just driving your own car along the freeway. You are
recommending interpretations that are going to control the lives of
other people, who disagree with you about these things.
PROFESSOR AMAR: My interpretations don't, thankfully. And
unlike some folks in the room, I am actually not a judge "wanna-be."
PROFESSOR EISGRUBER: But you are a judge influencer
"wanna-be." You want people to agree with your arguments when
you make them. Then you want them to act on the basis of those
arguments.
PROFESSOR AMAR: All that I want to say is: Here is an argument. Now tell me whether you agree and if you don't why, and if you
do, then maybe we can try to figure out what it is that appealed to
you, why you found this opinion a better exposition than that
opinion?
PROFESSOR EISGRUBER: So, eventually, you are going to have
to want a theory when people do end up disagreeing-as they areabout the cases that you care about.
PROFESSOR AMAR: I'm somewhat dubious of the idea of an
utterly deductive theory of an algorithm. I do think that I am very
powerfully influenced by Phillip Bobbit, and by Dick Fallon. I think
there are different techniques of constitutional interpretation. To do
constitutional interpretation is to be able to make arguments from
text and history and structure and practice and practicality, and then
often, as applied, one will have a sense that a certain set of arguments
in this context is more apt; they fit better.
PROFESSOR KACZOROWSKI: Mike McConnell.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: I wanted to
ask Jack Rakove about the implications of his argument for originalism in the following sense. It seems to me that originalism does
two
types of work which are almost at tension with each other. On the
one hand, it gives a theory for why judges today can tell the legislatures of today that the legislatures can't do what they want. An example of that would be the recent United States v. Lopez 3 case.
It seems to me the argument is very powerful against that or at least
it suggests that one should be very cautious in looking to an originalist
understanding of the Constitution in any kind of a rigid forum because, in fact, the framers understood themselves to be setting up an
experimental document and they were not doing something that was
in a rigid format. That seems to me to follow from your argument.
The other function that originalism plays in modem debate, and I
3. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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think it is the more interesting, controversial, and important one, is
that originalism is a reason why judges should not tell legislatures that
they can't do what they want to do when there is no grounding in the
text historically understood. Roe v. Wade4 is, of course, the modern
classic in that. And it doesn't seem to me that anything in your argument discredits that second use of originalism, that is orignialism as a
constraint on judicial moralizing.
PROFESSOR RAKOVE: Well, I don't know if you asked me this
as a historian or as a theorist. Let me say a couple of things, Michael,
and they may not completely answer your question directly. To begin
with-just to clarify my position-there is a limit to my indeterminacy
as a historian. I wouldn't be a historian if I didn't think we couldn't
come up with good evidence of, the best evidence possible, of why
certain provisions took the form they did. I'm that kind of historical
positivist, I guess. And I think Leonard Levy is too, even though his
own efforts to explain why judges could never use originalism successfully, I think, probably better describes what happens when originalists undertake this foray. I mean, I very much like the point that
Martin Flaherty makes in a recent paper taking on what strikes me as
the absolutely bizarre use by Scalia of the Massachusetts Constitution
in 1780 as a paradigmatic statement of the original theory of separated
power. That strikes me as ludicrous.
Let me now talk about judicial review, which I think is at the bottom of your inquiry as it is of this whole project, right? I think before
we get to any theory of judicial review, one has to understand just how
novel the concept of an independent judiciary was in the 1780s.
Gordon Wood pointed this out in his bibliography to The Creation of
the American Republic, and I think the point still has yet to sink in.
The whole idea of thinking of the judiciary as a third distinct body,
department of government, was itself a great novelty. How we go
about enforcing the written Constitution, and against whom I take it is
much more important to force it against the states than against Congress-is a second great novelty. Whether the decision makers are
themselves going to be judges or jurors is a third aspect of this, which I
think we are only starting to kind of come to grips here. Some people
have; it is there in some of Bill Nelson's work.
So, it seems to me that the idea that the Supreme Court's essential
function is appellate, that there will be a need to coordinate decisions
taking place in different venues, that they have a uniform law-as I
think Hamilton says in Federalist22, these are all propositions that are
getting started. But on the indeterminacy side, I think there is so
much novelty to the original conceptions of judicial independence, enforcement of written constitutions-and whether judges or jurors are
decision makers and, if so, who acts when and at what point, that I
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
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would be very reluctant to try to lock any kind of robust definition of
a strong originalist character into the understandings of 1787.

